

Investment and the Transfer of Power: Dynamic Effects of Transmission in Electricity Markets

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Presentation Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Model
- 4 Data
- 5 Estimation and Model Fit
- 6 Counterfactual Analysis
- 7 Conclusion

Motivating Observations

- Renewable generation is **intermittent** and geographically **dispersed**
- Electricity storage remains **costly and limited** in short-run
- Renewable potential is **uneven across regions**
- **Long-range transmission** is emerging as a key solution
- Investment in long-range transmission has been **minimal to date**

Potential for Renewable Generation by County




Figure 1: Potential for Wind and Solar Generation by County. Source: DoE

Existing and Planned High-voltage Direct Current Lines






Figure 2: Proposed Expansions Electricity Transmission. Source: EIA


Research Questions



Contribution: Framework



Counterfactual Policy Experiments



Contribution: Preliminary Results

● Short-run Results:

- Full Upgrade (2018–2023): average prices fall by **6%**.
- Welfare gains: **\$4 billion per year**, equal to about one-third of all congestion costs (Grid Strategies).
- Partial replacement (50% of lines): still delivers **5%+ price reduction**.
- Regional effects: largest price drops in the Northeast; modest price increases in the Midwest.

● Long-run Results:

- With Grain-belt express, **10%+ increase** in solar and wind adoption in Eastern Interconnection by 2050

Locational Marginal Price (LMP)




Figure 3: Congestion visualized (Source: NYISO)

Market Dynamics

- **No Constraints:**
Prices are uniform (λ).
- **Binding Constraints:**
Congestion causes local price separation.

LMP Calculation

$$\text{LMP} = \text{Energy} + \text{Loss} + \text{Congestion}$$

**Congestion component is non-zero only when transmission constraints bind.*

Network Topology: Prices and Constraints






Figure 4: Binding export constraints create price separation.


Static Effects: Price Convergence & Arbitrage



Dynamic Effects: The Investment Signal



Timeline of Short-run and Long-run Models



Short-run: A combined ISO minimizes dispatch costs subject to transmission constraints (engineering problem).

Long-run: Generators choose capacity to maximize profits given expected prices (equilibrium).

Short-run Model: ISO Problem

Objective: Minimize Cost of Generation

$$\pi_t = \min_q \sum_{i,j,k,g} c_{jkgt}(\dots, \mathbf{q}_{ijkgt}, \dots)$$

Subject to:

1. Balance

Supply = Demand

$$\sum (1 - B_{ij}) q_{ijkgt} = L_{it}$$

(at each node)

2. Grid Limits

Flow \leq Line Limit

$$\sum_k \sum_g q_{ijkgt} \leq A_{ij}$$

(per line and timestep)

3. Capacity

Gen \leq Max Output,
Exogenous for Renew-
able

$$0 \leq \sum q_{jkgt} \leq O_{jkgt}^{MAX}$$

(per generation unit)

Short-run Model: Cost Structure

General Form: Costs depend on cost shifters x , output q , and shock ϵ :

$$C_{jkgt}(x, q, \epsilon)$$

Fossil Fuels (Positive MC)

$$MC = \underbrace{x\beta}_{\text{Base}} + \underbrace{q\nu}_{\text{Slope}} + \epsilon$$




$$\epsilon \sim N(0, \Omega)$$

Renewables (Zero/Stochastic)

$$MC = \epsilon_{ijkgt}$$

(No fuel cost)



Identification Strategy:

- We observe the market price P , fuel mix across time, and cost shifters.
- For the **marginal resource**, $MC = LMP$.
- *Result:* We recover exact cost data for the price-setting unit and use constraints to estimate cost differences with other dispatched resources.

Long-run GenCo Problem

Bellman Equation

$$v_{gt}(\Theta) = \max_{\Delta O_g} \left[\sum_j \Pi_{jg}(\Theta) + \varepsilon_{jg}(\Delta O) + \beta \mathbb{E} v_{jgt+1}(\Theta') \right]$$

Period Profit Π_{jg} (Revenue - Cost)

$$\Pi_{jg} = \sum_k \left[\underbrace{D_{jkg} P_{jkg}}_{\text{Revenue}} - \underbrace{C_{jkg} D_{jkg}}_{\text{Op. Cost}} - \underbrace{F_k O_{jgk}}_{\text{Fixed}} - \underbrace{E_k \max(\Delta O_{jgk}, 0)}_{\text{Entry Cost}} \right]$$

Capacity

Endogenous Evolution:

$$O' = O + \Delta O$$

Cost Shocks (Integrated AR1)


Exogenous $x \in \{F, E\}$:

$$x'_k = \psi_x + \rho_x x_k + \zeta'_k, \quad \zeta \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

Dataset Overview

Spatial Granularity

- **54 Discrete Zones**
- Captured attributes: Load, Price, Gen, Capacity, cost shifters



Time Horizon

- **Historical:** 2018–2024 (Hourly)
- **Projection:** Extends to **2050**

Map of Prices by Zone





Figure 5: Prices by Zone.

Dataset Construction Process

Data Sources (2018–2023)



Short-Run Estimation: Model Construction

1. Composite Error

Difference out Transmission Constraint (λ) and Capacity Constraint (θ):

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_{ijkt} = \epsilon_{ijkt} - \epsilon_{i'jkt} - \epsilon_{ijk't}$$

2. Deterministic Component \tilde{V}_{ijkt}

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{V}_{ijkt} = & \underbrace{x_{jkt}\beta + q_{ijkt}\nu_k}_{\text{MC of resource } jk} - \underbrace{\frac{1 - B_{ij}}{1 - B_{ij''}} LMP_{it}}_{\text{MC of central resource}} \\ & + \underbrace{q_{i'jkt}\nu_k - q_{ijkt}\nu_k + \frac{LMP_{i't}}{1 - B_{i'j''}}(1 - B_{i'j}) - \frac{LMP_{it}}{1 - B_{ij''}}(1 - B_{ij})}_{\text{cost of transmission constraint}} \\ & + \underbrace{(x_{jk't}\beta + q_{ijk't}\nu_{k'}) - (x_{jkt}\beta + q_{ijkt}\nu_k)}_{\text{cost of capacity constraint}} \end{aligned}$$

Short-Run Estimation: Likelihood & Parameters

3. Likelihood Function

Multivariate normal, variance–covariance Ω :

$$\mathcal{L} = \prod_{t=1}^T P_t(\tilde{V}_{111t}, \dots, \tilde{V}_{IJKt})$$

MLE Recovers

$$\hat{\beta}, \hat{\nu}_k$$

β : Observable cost shifters

ν_k : Resource-type marginal cost

Variance–Covariance

$$\hat{\Omega}$$

Captures correlations across zones, resources, and time within generator portfolios

Long-Run Equilibrium Computation: Nested Fixed Point

Outer Loop: Iterate on Beliefs about Rival Investment

- 1 Initialize beliefs over aggregate rival capacity changes
- 2 Solve each firm's DP via backward induction (inner loop)
- 3 Update beliefs using implied investment distributions
- 4 Check convergence: $\max |\sigma^{(n+1)} - \sigma^{(n)}| < \epsilon$

Equilibrium Concept: Oblivious

Firms condition on own state + aggregate rival capacity (not full joint distribution).

Reduces dimensionality while preserving the strategic investment channel.

Selection Rule

Sequential moves in descending order of installed capacity.

GMM Estimation: Moment Conditions

36 Moments (overidentified: $36 > 32$ parameters)

Moments constructed from simulated vs. observed investment decisions.

Natural Gas, Solar, Wind (per type)

$\mathbb{1}(\Delta O_{jkg} > 0) \times \Delta O_{jkg}$	Positive inv. \times qty
$(\Delta O_{jkg})^2$	Investment squared
$\mathbb{1}(\Delta O_{jkg} > 500)$	Large inv. indicator
$\Delta O_{jkg} \times \sum_j O_{jkg}$	Capacity interaction
$\text{Var}(\Delta O_{jkg})$	Investment variance
$ \min(\Delta O_{jkg}, 0) $	Retirements

Coal

Moments focus on retirement behavior.

One investment moment included to anchor entry cost scale.

Estimated Cost Coefficients Short-Run





Figure 7: Intercept and Export Sensitivity Estimates by Resource.

Cost Function Shifter Estimates: Coal and Natural Gas



Preliminary Model Fit: Long-run




Figure 8: Actual vs. Simulated Capacity Mix Evolution over Time.

Counterfactual Simulation Scenarios

SCENARIO	DESCRIPTION	Modified Primitives		
		LINE A_{ij}, B_{ij}	ENTRY E_k	REVENUE P_k^{eff}
Panel A — Transmission Infrastructure Upgrades				
Full HVDC	All inter-zonal lines upgraded	✓		
Partial HVDC	Random subset at intensity $\alpha \in (0, 1)$	✓		
Panel B — New Long-Distance Transmission				
No constraints	All transmission limits removed	✓		
Grain Belt Express	5,000 MW HVDC, KS to IN	✓		
ERCOT–Eastern IC	HVDC link, ERCOT to Southeast	✓		
Panel C — Federal Legislation				
BIG WIRES Act	MITC $\geq 30\%$ peak demand by 2035	✓		
<i>IRA \times BIL Factorial Design</i>				
Baseline	Neither IRA nor BIL			
IRA only	IRA enacted, no BIL		✓	✓
BIL only	BIL enacted, no IRA	✓		
As enacted	Both IRA and BIL	✓	✓	✓
Panel D — Cross-Cutting Analysis				
Welfare decomposition	Producer/consumer surplus by zone	Applied to all scenarios		

Notes: Each scenario holds estimated structural parameters fixed and modifies only the indicated primitives. A_{ij} : inter-zonal transfer capacity; E_k : technology-specific entry cost; P_k^{eff} : effective per-MWh revenue inclusive of PTCs. All policy wedges phase in via $\rho(t; t_0, R)$. Panel C uses identical random seeds.

BIG WIRES ACT visual




Figure 2: Map of existing and additional interregional transfer capacity between regions

Figure 9: Big Wires Act Visualized

Price Decrease by Percentage Grid Upgrade




Figure 10: Price Decrease by Percentage Grid Upgrade.

Conclusion

- **Model transmission dynamics:** Develop a structural model capturing how grid constraints shape spatial price formation and congestion patterns
- **Short-run price effects:** Quantify how transmission capacity and network topology influence locational marginal prices and price volatility
- **Long-run investment implications:** Trace how transmission-induced price signals propagate to generation capacity decisions and resource adequacy outcomes

Thank You!