

Investment and the Transfer of Power: Dynamic Effects of Transmission in Electricity Markets



Dana Golden^{1,2}


¹Stony Brook Economics

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Motivation

- Renewable resources intermittent and dispersed
- Storage of electricity difficult and cost prohibitive
- Not all areas have strong renewable potential
- Long-range transmission has started to emerge as a solution
- Limited prior investment in long-range transmission

Data Feature: Prices and Renewables Vary with Space and Time



Research Questions

- What are the impacts of transmission constraints on price?
- If market frictions in long-distance trading of electricity decreased, how would this impact capacity investment?
- How would increases in transmission affect reliability and emissions?
- What would be the impact of the Big Wires Act?

Data Construction Process






Figure 2. Data Construction Diagram.

Model Primitives: Short-run feeds Long-Run



Model Graphically: Trade equalizes prices



Short-run Model Mathematically

- Short-term Model: ISOs minimize cost to satisfy all retail demand L_{it} at each node i

$$\pi_t = \max_{\{q_{ijkgt}\}_{i,j,k,g,t \in I,J,K,G,T}} [-\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{g=1}^G c_{jkgt}(x_{jkgt}, q_{ijkgt}, \epsilon_{ijkgt})] s.t. \quad (1)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{g=1}^G (1 - B_{ij}) q_{ijkgt} = L_{it} \forall i$$

Resource constraint


$$\sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{g=1}^G q_{ijkgt} \leq A_{ij} \forall i, j, t$$

Transmission constraint

$$0 < \sum_i q_{ijkgt} \leq O_{jkgt}^{MAX} \forall j, k, g, t.$$

Capacity constraint

Data Feature: Growth of Renewables over Time



Long-run Model Mathematically

- Long-term model: Generators invest in generation capacity to maximize profits

$$v_{gt}(\Theta) = \max_{\Delta O_{jg}} \sum_j \Pi_{jg}(\Theta) + \epsilon_{jg}(\Delta O_{jg}) + \beta \mathbb{E} v_{jgt+1}(\Theta') \quad s.t. \quad (2)$$

$$\Pi_{jg} = \sum_k [D_{jkg}(d_{jkg}, O_{jkg}, O_{jkg}^-) P_{jkg}]$$

Revenue

$$- \underbrace{C_{jkg}(d_{jkg}, O_{jkg}, O_{jkg}^-) D_{jkg}(d_{jkg}, O_{jkg}, O_{jkg}^-) - F_k O_{jkg} - E_k \max(\Delta O_{jkg}, 0)}_{\text{Costs}}$$

$$O'_{jgk} = O_{jgk} + \Delta O_{jgk}$$

Evolution of capacity

$$F'_k = \psi_{1k} + \rho_{1k} F_k + \zeta'_{k1}, \zeta_1 \sim N(0, \sigma_{\zeta_1}^2)$$

$$E'_k = \psi_{2k} + \rho_{2k} E_k + \zeta'_{k2}, \zeta_2 \sim N(0, \sigma_{\zeta_2}^2)$$

Evolution of costs

Estimation Strategy

- Short-run Estimation**
 - Find transmission capacities between zones
 - Solve Lagrangian for Euler equations
 - Use zero shadow prices at central resource locations to solve for shadow prices at other locations and resources
 - Isolate and solve for errors
 - Perform maximum likelihood estimation
- Long-run Estimation**
 - Utilizes Erikson-Pakes (1995) estimation procedure for dynamic games
 - Combines with Gowrisankaran, Schmidt-Dengler (2024) procedure for reducing choice candidates in dynamic capacity games
 - Uses generalized method of moments to estimate parameters

Conclusions and Next Steps

- Conclusions**
 - The renewables transition requires an improved grid
 - Long-distance transmission equalizes prices and provides price insurance
 - Improving transmission has static and dynamic effects on markets
- Next Steps**
 - Estimate short-run likelihood function using Jax
 - Estimate long-run model using GMM and Gowrisankaran, Schmidt-Dengler (2024)
 - Run counterfactuals